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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT), in spite of its innumerable advantages, brings many challenges namely issues about
users’ privacy preservation and constraints about lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptography is of capital
importance since IoT devices are qualified to be resource-constrained. To address these challenges, several Attribute-
Based Credentials (ABC) schemes have been designed including I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix. Even though these schemes
have very strong cryptographic bases, their performance in resource-constrained devices is a question that deserves
special attention. Therefor, this paper aims to conduct a performance evaluation of these schemes on issuance and
verification protocols regarding memory usage and computing time. Recorded results show that both I2PA and U-
prove present very interesting results regarding memory usage and computing time while Idemix presents very low
performance with regard to computing time compared to I2PA and U-prove.
Index Terms
ABC, Anonymity, Credential, IoT, Performances, Privacy, Lightweight cryptography
1. Introduction
Out of several emerging technologies and concepts, the Internet of Things is a new paradigm that brings both challenges
and opportunities [1]. According to Ashton Kevin, to whom we owe the term "Internet of Things", the IoT has the potential
to change the world, as did the Internet, maybe even more [2]. The Internet of Things represents a vision in which the
Internet extends into the real world embracing everyday objects [3]. However, as mentioned above, it brings many challenges
including issues about users’ privacy preservation and constraints about lightweight cryptography [4]. We are among those
who think that the protection of privacy is a fundamental right and its loss would lead to the restriction of freedom [5].
Lightweight cryptography is a strong constraint because IoT devices are qualified to be resource-constrained. Indeed, these
devices have three major constraints namely low energy autonomy, very limited storage capacity and very low computing
power [4]. From there, were designed several schemes and the most promising include I2PA [4], Idemix [6], and U-prove
[7]. These schemes are based on recognized robust cryptosystems. However, the question of their applicability in an IoT
context, therefore in resource-constrained devices, is of capital importance. Roughly results recorded in [4] on issuance and
verification of credentials made up of 10 attributes show that I2PA and U-prove are more efficient than Idemix regarding
computing time efficiency. However, what about memory usage and computing time efficiency on different number of
attributes ? In this paper, we provide a deeper evaluation by regarding memory usage and computing time while issuing
and verifying credentials made up of 1, 5, and 10 attributes respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is related to background review while related works are presented
in Section 3. Section 4 describes experimental set-up whereas recorded results and discussions are depicted in Section 5.
This paper is ended by a conclusion and perspectives in Section 6.
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2. Background Review
We now recall few notions about Attribute-Based Credentials (ABC), Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC), Binary Scalar
Multiplication (BSM), and Extended Homogeneous Coordinates (EHC). We refer readers to [4], [8], [9], [10], [11] for more
details about discussed concepts in this section.
2.1. Attribute-Based Credential
Attribute-Based Credentials are mechanisms of authentication that allow to flexibly and selectively authenticate different
attributes about an entity without revealing additional information about that entity. As a result, they do not necessarily
identify the user, as they only provide authentic assertions about the user [4], [8], [9]. They are building blocks that aim at
protecting users’ privacy preservation.
2.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was presented independently by Koblitz [12] and Miller [13] in the 1980s. Their
structure of group and performance in computing time they offer make them a new direction in cryptography [4]. They
offer good level of security with smaller key size. They are also less Central Processing Unit (CPU) intensive so they are
ideal for resource-constrained devices.
2.3. Binary Scalar Multiplication
The fundamental operation of ECC is point scalar computation (also known as scalar multiplication) of the form [4]:
Q = k.P = P + P + . . .+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
Security in ECC is based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [4], [10] that can be summarized
as follows. Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp. Let P,Q ∈ E(Fp), find k ∈ Fq, if it exists, such
that Q = k.P (q denotes the order of P ). Scalar multiplication can be performed efficiently when tackling small numbers.
However, when numbers hold in many bits (160 for instance), this might take lot of time. Several methods have been designed
so far to speed up these operations including the double-and-add algorithm also known as binary algorithm. This algorithm
is a very elegant technique to perform multiplication of big numbers. Two versions of this algorithm exist that either scan
the scalar in a left to right or right to left direction [14]. Let k be an integer such that k(10) = (knkn−1 . . . k1k0)(2), where
ki ∈ {0, 1}, kn = 1 and n ≥ 1. The left to right version is described in "Algorithm 1".
Algorithm 1: Left to right double-and-add
Input: P ∈ E(Fp), k ∈ Fq
Result: k.P ∈ E(Fp)
1 R ←P
2 for i← n− 1 to 0 do
3 R ←2.R
4 if ki = 1 then
5 R ←R+P
6 end
7 end
8 return R
The "Algorithm 1" is simple, efficient and has an average complexity of nD + n2A (D and A denote respectively
the number of double and add operations). Implementations of I2PA and U-prove are based on this technique seeing its
simplicity, its low complexity, and its easy implementation in place of other methods like Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) also
known as Signed Binary Representation (SBR) which presents a more interesting complexity (nD + n3A) but requires a
supplementary treatment on the representation of the scalar. Let us consider a device with a processor clocked at 1GHz and
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k = 240. Computing k.P with decimal representation of k would require around 19 minutes while with binary representation,
this would take less than 1 millisecond. We remind that the number of bits required to represent a positive integer n in
radix 2 is at most equal to ceil(log2(n))+ 1, where ceil(x) denotes the rounds of x up to the nearest integer. These results
show how relevant it is to use this technique instead of decimal representation.
2.4. Extended Homogeneous Coordinates
According to our experimental parameters (see Section 4.3), Simon et al. [11] recommended to use extended homoge-
neous coordinates (EHCs). In the EHCs representation, (x, y) is represented as (X : Y : Z : T ) where x = XZ , y =
Y
Z
and xy = TZ . The neutral point (0, 1) is equivalent to (0 : Z : Z : 0) for any nonzero Z. Coordinates (X : Y : Z : T )
and (λX : λY : λZ : λT ) are equivalent for any nonzero λ. EHMs avoid inversion operations and, as a result, improve
computing time efficiency. We refer readers to [11] for more details. Details of add and double formulas are presented
respectively in "Algorithm 2" and "Algorithm 3".
Algorithm 2: Add formula
Input: P1, P2 ∈ E(Fp)
Result: P1 + P2 ∈ E(Fp)
1 A ← (Y1 −X1)(Y2 −X2)
2 B ← (Y1 +X1)(Y2 +X2)
3 C ← 2dT1T2
4 D ← 2Z1Z2
5 E ← B −A
6 F ← D − C
7 G ← D + C
8 H ← B +A
9 (X,Y, Z, T )← (EF,GH,FG,EH) return
(X : Y : Z : T )
Algorithm 3: Double formula
Input: P ∈ E(Fp)
Result: 2.P ∈ E(Fp)
1 A ← X2
2 B ← Y 2
3 C ← 2Z2
4 D ← (X + Y )2
5 H ← B +A
6 E ← H −D
7 G ← A−B
8 F ← C +G
9 (X ′, Y ′, Z ′, T ′)← (EF,GH,FG,EH) return
(X ′ : Y ′ : Z ′ : T ′)
3. Related Works
The Internet of Things brings both challenges and opportunities [1]. Indeed, in an IoT context, performance, privacy
preservation, and lightweight cryptography are key aspects that must be taken into account with special attention. To the best
of our knowledge, the best way of protecting users’ privacy preservation remains using Attributes-Based Credentials (ABC)
also known as Privacy-ABC. Many ABC schemes have been designed so far including I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix. However,
few works evaluate the efficiency of these schemes in an IoT context. On a theoretical level, authors of [15], [16] have
addressed the importance of computational efficiency in resource-constrained devices. Fatbardh et al. [17] have evaluated
the computational efficiency of Idemix and U-prove. Their results shown that U-prove is more efficient than Idemix for the
User operation (proving) and in general when a credential has more attributes. They have also stated that Idemix is more
efficient in the rest of the cases, especially when advanced presentation features are used. Their simulation uses a computer
with a processor of 1.8 GHz Intel Core i7 and both schemes are instantiated using the RSA cryptosystem. Veseli et al. [18]
have addressed storage and communication efficiency of Idemix and U-prove. Their results suggest that for storage, Idemix
is more efficient than U-prove, since a single credential provides multiple-show unlinkability. They have also pointed out
that, in terms of communication efficiency, Idemix is more efficient for issuance, whereas U-prove is more efficient for
presentation of credentials. They have developed a number of experiments in Java, which have been executed on a computer
with a processor of 1.8 GHz Intel Core i7 and schemes are based on the RSA cryptosystem. Vullers et al. [19] have presented
an efficient selective disclosure on smart cards using Idemix (using the MULTOS platform). Their implementation is based
on a 1024 bits security level. They asserted that Idemix’s selective disclosure can be efficiently implemented on a smart
card. Mostowski et al. [20] provided an efficient U-prove implementation for Anonymous Credentials on smart cards (Using
the MULTOS platform). Their implementation aims at making the smart card independent of any other resources, either
computational or storage. Their performance results strongly support their idea to use a stand-alone U-prove smart card rather
than the Microsoft device-protection approach, which seems to overlook the current capabilities of smart cards. SENE et al.
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[4] have conducted a comparison of I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix on issuance and verification regarding computing time for
credentials made up of 10 attributes. They have instantiated U-prove using ECC and their results have shown that U-prove
presented more interesting results than Idemix regarding computing time on issuance and verification protocols. I2PA and
U-prove present nearby performance even though I2PA’s results are more interesting. Although these works have presented
interesting results, most of them have focused on the efficiency of a particular implementation of a particular technology,
and on a particular platform. Some of them were interested in many schemes or many aspects of privacy preservation but
used computer which does not give any idea on low-resource devices efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first contribution that evaluates efficiency of I2PA, U-prove and Idemix in an IoT context regarding computing time and
memory usage. Furthermore, as far as we know, it is also the first one that considers ECC-based U-prove instantiation in
low-resource devices.
4. Experimental Setup
This section describes both hardware and software setup. It also describes curve and parameters used to perform this
evaluation.
4.1. Hardware Setup
The hardware setup consists of a smartphone and a Raspberry Pi. The Raspberry Pi ("Figure 1") is used to deploy both
issuer and verifier. We describe some of its characteristics below:
• Model Pi 3 B+
• 1 Go of SDRAM LPDDR2
• A 64-bit quad core processor clocked at 1.4 GHz
• Raspbian operating system.
• Dual Band 2.4 GHz and 5GHz IEEE 802.11. b/g/n/AC Wireless LAN
• Enhanced Ethernet performance over USB 2.0 (maximum throughput of 300 Mbps)
Figure 1: Hardware environment
The smartphone ("Figure 2") acts as a user. Some of its characteristics are depicted below:
• Model TECNO SPARK KB7j
• RAM 2GB
• ROM 16GB
• CPU 2.0GH*4
• Battery 3500 mAh
• Memory 16GB
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(a) Initial view (b) Processing view (c) Result view
Figure 2: Android application’s screenshots.
4.2. Software Setup
The software environment is made up of three major components that are issuer, verifier, and user ("Figure 3"). Issuer
and verifier are Java Socket while user is an Android application. We are running both the issuer and the verifier on the
same device (the Raspberry Pi) while the user is running on a smartphone. The "Figure 3" is an overview of software
components.
Figure 3: Software environment
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4.3. Parameters
Edwards’ curves are known to offer better performances among all Elliptic Curve (EC) families [21]. The Curve25519
was introduced as an ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) function but it is known today as the underlying elliptic curve
designed for use with ECDH key agreement scheme (X25519) or with ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
signature (Ed25519). It was first introduced in its Montgomery form E : v2 = u3 + 486662u2 + u over the prime field
defined by p = 2255 − 19. This curve ensures a 128-bit security level as the fastest known attack on the discrete logarithm
problem [22]. Nowadays, it is used in Protocols, Networks, Operating Systems, Software, SSH Software, TLS Libraries,
etc. [23]. Below, we describe parameters used in our performance evaluation and they are adapted from [22]. The parameter
k defines keys’ size for schemes I2PA and U-prove while k′ defines Idemix’s keys size. The parameter p defines the field
Zp, d defines the elliptic curve Ed : x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2. Values x0 and y0 define the coordinates of the base point P
with order q. The component Z0 defines the third component in extended homogeneous coordinates of the base point. We
refer reader to [10], [24] for keys’ size justification. Parameters’ values are depicted below:
• k = 160
• k′ = 1024
• p = 2255 − 19
• d = 37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283555
• x0 = 15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202
• y0 = 46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960
• Z0 = 1
• q = 2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493
At the core of ABC schemes, we have attributes. An attribute is a characteristic or a qualification of a person [4]. It
certifies that an entity has skill, knowledge, qualification, etc. An attribute certified by a third party is known as a claim.
Whatever the nature of an attribute, it can be represented in a decimal format. Therefore, attributes’ values used in this
evaluation are described below:
• a0=3022871045856445402
• a1=2303921356947
• a2=63990592803
• a3=63188281798077
• a4=2334544185927680150715
• a5=72478959060716899515
• a6=132108418240270107954363
• a7=53359477949683103
• a8=393090009322226684739352798186683
• a9=2930303348526267
5. Results and Discussion
This section depicts and comments results of our performance evaluation. Unless explicitly stated, time will always
be expressed in milliseconds (ms) and memory in Megabyte (MB). It should also be noted that, for memory metrics, all
values are rounded to two decimal places. We remind that U-prove and I2PA are instantiated using ECC as mentioned
before. The implemented versions of U-prove and Idemix are based on schemes presented by Gergely Alpár [9] while I2PA
implementation is based on the scheme presented by SENE et al. [4]. We point out that every simulation is carried out with
new random parameters except system’s parameters and attributes’ values.
5.1. Limitations
We note some limitations that should be taken into account while exploring results presented thereafter.
• Our results are based on the openly available versions of U-prove and Idemix.
• During the issuance phase and at user side, when the issuer takes lots of times to issue credential, recorded minima in
terms of memory usage at user side may be biased. The user may remain idle for a while which considerably lowers
used resources. This is the case with Idemix since its issuance requires lots of times (See "Figure 7").
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• During the verification phase, in order not to impact memory usage, we first issue a credential and then verify it
immediately instead of storing all credentials that should be verified. This may impact the recorded minima at verifier
side if the issuance of a credential takes lots of times. The later may remain idle for a while what considerably lowers
used resources. This is the case with Idemix that requires a lot of times to issue a credential (See "Figure 7").
5.2. Memory Usage Evaluation
This section describes results about memory usage. Figures presented below are recorded with VisualVM 1.3.9 [25]
using "Tracer-Monitor Probes" plugin. Evaluations involve 100 simulations on issuance and verification of credentials made
up of 1, 5, and 10 attributes respectively.
5.2.1. Issuance. In this section, we describe memory evaluation at issuer and user sides. At issuer side (respectively at user
side), we evaluate the memory required to issue (respectively to get) a credential.
At issuer side: Recorded results from issuance of credentials made up of 1, 5, and 10 attributes respectively are
presented in "Figure 4".
Figure 4: Issuance memory usage at issuer side
As shown in "Figure 4", the three schemes present nearby performance regarding memory usage at issuer side while
issuing credentials. At first glance, this may seem paradoxical seeing keys’ size (160 for I2PA and U-prove, 1024 for
Idemix). However, this can be explained by the usage of extended homogeneous coordinates while instantiating U-prove
and I2PA. Nevertheless, in all cases, Idemix requires more resource in average and records highest maxima. U-prove and
I2PA, in three cases, have nearby average consumptions; 3.92 against 3.65 (respectively 4.21 against 4.2, and 3.51 against
3.95) for issuance of 1 attribute (respectively 5 and 10 attributes)
At user side: This section describes memory usage at user side while issuing credentials of 1, 5, and 10 attributes
respectively. We shall not evaluate the memory usage in the verification phase since the user only presents her credential;
she performs no operation. Due to limitations noted in the mobile application while recording memory usage at user side,
we recorded these results with a user implemented using Java socket and running in a Raspberry PI. The "Figure 5" is an
illustration of recorded results.
7 | 11
I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix: An Evaluation of Memory Usage and Computing Time Efficiency in an IoT Context
Figure 5: Issuance memory usage at user side
"Figure 5" shows that, as we have already pointed out in the limitations (Section 5.1), Idemix has very low minima (1.79,
1.89, and 1.81) compared to other schemes (2.29, 2.34, and 2.48 for I2PA, 2.63, 2.48, and 2.25 for U-prove). Despite the
fact that three schemes present nearby consumptions, Idemix has higher maxima and requires more resources on average.
5.2.2. Verification. If the credentials to verify are generated and stored beforehand, this may greatly affect memory usage
and then influences recorded results. We verify a credential after generating it. This frees the memory once the credential
is verified. "Figure 6" illustrates recorded results while verifying credentials of 1, 5, and 10 attributes respectively.
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Figure 6: Verification memory usage at verifier side
"Figure 6" shows that, globally, tendencies recorded here do not differ from those presented in previous sections. We
can note that on average, Idemix, requires more memory than I2PA and U-prove. Except for the verification of credentials
made up of 5 attributes, Idemix presents the highest average values. I2PA, in all three cases, has an average value smaller
than that present by U-prove and Idemix.
5.3. Time Evaluation
This section describes results recorded regarding computing time. These results concern 100 simulations involving
credentials of 1, 5, and 10 attributes respectively. We shall consider the time required at user side to get a credential from
an issuer as well as the one required to have a credential verified by a verifier.
5.3.1. Issuance. Results recorded from issuance of credentials made up of 1, 5, and 10 attributes are illustrated in "Figure
7". We illustrate minima, maxima, as well as average values.
Figure 7: Time issuance comparison
"Figure 7" shows that I2PA and U-prove have similar performance regarding computing time efficiency. However, I2PA
presents more interesting result than U-prove. Idemix, meanwhile, has very low performance compared to I2PA and U-
prove. The time it requires for issuance is on average at least 3 times (respectively 8 and 13) more important than that
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required by I2PA and U-prove for issuance of credential made up of 1 attribute (respectively 5 and 10 attributes). Regarding
distribution of time for credential containing 1 attribute (respectively 5 and 10 attributes), 33% (respectively 45% and 50%)
of simulations have duration higher or equal to the average for I2PA, 38% (respectively 45% and 49%) for U-prove, and
35% (respectively 39% and 51%) for Idemix. Finally, regarding computing time efficiency, I2PA and U-prove present more
interesting result than Idemix. What should be the number of attributes (1, 5, or 10), I2PA and U-prove require less than 1
second for credential issuance, what can be considered as relevant.
5.3.2. Verification:. As for the issuance, this section describes recorded results while verifying 100 credentials of 1, 5, and
10 attributes respectively. "Figure 8" illustrates registered results.
Figure 8: Time verification comparison
"Figure 8" shows that, as for the issuance, I2PA and U-prove present similar performances on the verification protocol
regarding computing time efficiency. However, except the maximum recorded during the verification of credentials made
up of 10 attributes, I2PA requires less computing time compared to U-prove. Idemix, meanwhile, has very low performance
compared to I2PA and U-prove. The time it requires for verification is on average at least 7 times (respectively 8 and 8)
more important than that required by I2PA and U-prove for verification of credentials made up of 1 attribute (respectively
5 and 10 attributes). Regarding distribution of time for credentials of 1 attribute (respectively 5 and 10 attributes), 22%
(respectively 10% and 21%) of simulations have duration higher or equal to the average for I2PA, 13% (respectively 13%
and 50%) for U-prove and 39% (respectively 54% and 12%) for Idemix . Finally, regarding computing time efficiency, we
can safely assert that I2PA and U-prove present more interesting result than Idemix on verification protocol. They can thus
be envisaged in a context of resource-constrained devices.
6. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, the performance evaluation of I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix we conducted in low-resource devices, was
focused in evaluating computing time and memory usage efficiency. Three types of conclusions can be drawn:
• In terms of memory usage at issuer, user or verifier sides, I2PA, U-prove, and Idemix present nearby consumptions
if I2PA and U-prove are instantiated using ECC and ECH representation. However, in average, Idemix requires more
memory than I2PA and U-prove.
• In terms of computing time efficiency, Idemix has very low performances compared to I2PA and U-prove. The time
it requires for issuance (respectively verification) is at least 3 times (respectively 7 times) more important than that
requires by I2PA and U-prove.
• Even though EHC representation speeds up operations over the curve, it increases memory usage.
Finally, for computing time and memory usage efficiency criteria, I2PA and U-prove are two schemes that can be
envisaged in an IoT context. However, for an effective choice, other criteria must be taken into account including issuance
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unlinkability, multi-show unlinkability, selective disclosure, randomization, etc. This evaluation, for reasons of completeness,
could be extended by studying randomization and selective disclosure protocols efficiency as well as bandwidth usage.
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